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THE DEATH PENALTY AFTER FURMAN
Carol S. Vance*
Introduction
Anyone interested in the death penalty, be he historian or student, lawyer
or layman, advocate or antagonist, should read the Furman v. Georgia, deci-
sion. Nine justices in nine separate opinions painstakingly and articulately
delivered their views with a sense of history and deliberate thoroughness seldom
found in a single case.
The purpose of this article will not be to belabor these opinions or try to
create holy writ from inferences or impressions of the utterances of the court.
Instead, it shall be my purpose to discuss the practical problems and alternatives
that face the vast majority of this country's citizens who want a death penalty
for certain crimes.
With this in mind, I will explore:
1) Where are we? A brief summary of the position of the court at this
time.
2) Is there a remedy? What type of legislation could be promulgated
which might be upheld from a constitutional standpoint?
3) Is the death penalty worth the effort?
I. Where Are We?
Probably no topic within the purview of our criminal justice system has
been debated and discussed with the fervor of the death penalty.
With an anxious intensity, judges, lawyers, police, and the American people
agonizingly awaited a decade for legal clarification as the United States Supreme
Court seemingly avoided the issue at every opportunity. By the time the ques-
tion was answered, if it was, in the historic Furman v. Georgia opinion, over 600
death row inmates had experienced a cruel and unusual wait for a definite an-
swer. The United States Supreme Court faced a dilemma of extreme social
consequences. It is one thing for Americans to want a death penalty for heinous
crimes, but another to face the inevitable result of over 600 executions within
a short period of time.
Still the decision shocked the conscience of many Americans. Even death
penalty antagonists could not comprehend how one opinion could overrule the
duly enacted statutes of some 41 states. Not only were the statutes of the indi-
vidual states overruled, but also legislation by the Congress of the United States.
The aircraft piracy statute2 was enacted by the United States Senate by a vote
* District Attorney of Harris County, Texas, and President of the National District At-
torneys Association.
1 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970).
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of 92-0, with the eight absent Senators stating they would have made the vote
unanimous. Thus we witnessed a classic example of a 5-4 decision that over-
turned the legislative processes and nearly two centuries of American jurispru-
dence.
But this is our system. Any five justices can legislate with unhampered
power. In this instance they did, and the death penalty as we knew it, is no
more. The four dissenting justices articulately answered the majority opinions
with a clarity and logic that leave little else to be added. Perhaps Mr. Justice
Burger, who personally found the death penalty repugnant, best summed up
the historical viewpoint when he quoted Mr. Chief Justice Warren:
... Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on
moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-
and they are forceful-the death penalty -has been employed throughout
our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said
to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.3
and the legal viewpoint by quoting Mr. Justice Black, who not very long ago in
McGautha v. California' said:
The Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." In my
view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that
penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries
from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted.
It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punish-
ment by the Amendment.5
From a reading of the dissents, I believe we can assume four justices would
uphold any death penalty legislation consistent with decisions prior to Furman.
So the first and simple conclusion is that any future legislation must be accept-
able to at least one of the five justices of majority opinion.
At the risk of oversimplification, it is probably safe to conclude that Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall would not consider any death penalty statute
constitutional under any circumstances. Their general conclusion is the death
penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment and violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
Therefore, our attention must turn to the opinions of Justices Stewart and
White, who may have left the door open for death penalty legislation along
very restricted lines. Both of their opinions are short and must be considered
separately and in depth.
Justice Stewart makes it clear at the outset that he finds "it unnecessary
to reach the ultimate question," i.e., whether the death penalty per se is uncon-
stitutional by reason of its being a cruel and unusual punishment. He finds it
cruel and unusual because of the wanton and freakish way it had been imposed
in cases before the Court and because of the wide discretion left by the legis-
3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958), quoted 408 U.S. at 381.
4 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
5 M cGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971), quoted 408 U.S. at 381.
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lature to the jury without any statutory guidelines.6 Specifically, Justice Stewart
said:
[T]hese sentences . . . are "cruel" in the sense that they excessively go
beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures
have determined to be necessary. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349.
In the second place, it is equally clear that these sentences are "unusual"
in the sense that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder,
and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare. But I do not rest
my conclusion upon these two propositions alone.
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people con-
victed of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible
as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.
7
Therefore, it is difficult to determine what Justice Stewart's conclusion
would be if he answered the ultimate question. If we assume Justice Stewart
would uphold the death penalty, we must also conclude that he would only
uphold legislation containing very specific guidelines as to when the death
penalty would be imposed. Any statute that would permit a jury or a judge to
give one murderer a prison sentence and another (under the same circum-
stances) the death penalty would probably not meet Justice Stewart's rationale.
Justice White leaves the door open wider. I think it reasonable to assume
he would uphold certain types of death penalty legislation when he states:
In joining the Court's judgments, therefore, I do not at all intimate that
the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of
capital punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment. That
question, ably argued by several of my Brethren, is not presented by these
cases and need not be decided."
However, we must recognize the fact Justice White is not positively com-
mitted to upholding any death penalty statute.
Somewhat similar to Justice Stewart's position Justice White expresses
concern over three points as he writes:
(1) the legislature authorizes the imposition of the death penalty for murder
or rape; (2) the legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any
particular class or kind of case (that is, legislative will is not frustrated if
the penalty is never imposed) but delegates to judges or juries the decisions
as to those cases, if any, in which the penalty will be utilized; and (3) judges
and juries have ordered the death penalty with such infrequency that the
odds are now very much against imposition and execution of the penalty
with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist. It is in this context that
we must consider whether the execution of these petitioners would violate
the Eighth Amendment."
6 408 U.S. at 306-10.
7 Id. at 309-10.
8 Id. at 310-11.
9 Id. at 311.
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Justice White also put great emphasis on the fact the death penalty was
seldom enforced. He said:
But common sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws become
ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the death
penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribu-
tion to deterring those crimes, for which it may be exacted. 10
It should be noted that nearly every point Justice White and his brothers
on the Court made with respect to the infrequent enforcement of the death
penalty could likewise be made with respect to life imprisonment or any long
prison terms. The records will adequately reflect that relatively few persons
charged with first-degree murder, robbery by firearms, rape or any traditional
death penalty offense end up with life imprisonment or its equivalent. However,
Justice White concluded:
... I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now
administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.
S.. [T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily
in juries-a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harsh-
ness of the law and to bring a community judgment to bear on the sentence
as well as guilt or innocence-has so effectively achieved its aims that
capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has
for all practical purposes run its course. 1
Giving authority to the jury to determine the death penalty may void a
statute in Justice White's opinion as he said:
In this respect, I add only that the past and present legislative judgment
with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in
light of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the
jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating
its trust or any statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty
no matter what the circumstances of the crime. Legislative "policy" is
thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what
juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred
upon them. In my judgment what was done in these cases violated the
Eighth Amendment."2
Where are we? No definite conclusion can be drawn, but one can surmise
that new legislation must take away discretion from the punishing authority-
particularly if it is the jury.
10 Id. at 312.
11 Id. at 313.12 Ird. at 314.
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II. Is There a Remedy?
Yes, there is one certain remedy. This is by way of constitutional amend-
ment, which would require proposition by two-thirds of both Houses and ratifi-
cation by the legislatures of three-fourths or at least 38 states. This is conceivable
in that forty-one states have the death penalty at present, and as violent crimes
soar, there seems to be a ground swell for the death penalty in certain instances.
Even such a constitutional amendment must be drawn with care. Keep in
mind the Constitution as presently written implies acceptance of the death
penalty in the fifth amendment, an amendment that is very much in force. My
suggestion for wording would be:
The discretionary use, by jury, judge, or other sentencing authority of
the death penalty by hanging, electrocution, gas chamber, or other
humane device, is not a cruel or unusual punishment and is not a viola-
tion of any right under this Constitution.
This would be simple. The intent is clear. Yet it must be kept in mind that
death sentences could always be set aside because of the way they were admin-
istered notwithstanding the above amendment.
As a practical matter, such an amendment is, at best, several years away.
Ratification by thirty-eight states' legislative bodies on such a controversial and
emotional issue doesn't come overnight. And there are probably a few death
penalty states, where the issue is sufficiently close, in which new legislation in this
direction would be difficult to enact.
In the interim, our concern must focus on possible statutes that might
meet the test of Furman v. Georgia.
There are several approaches that could be suggested. In fact, Florida took
the lead by passing a statute just a few short weeks after the motion for rehear-
ing was overruled in the Furman case.
In the Florida bill, a person convicted of a capital felony may receive death
after a special sentencing procedure. Capital felonies are only applicable to
murder "when perpetrated from a premeditated design" or an unlawful killing
"in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any" arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, handling a bomb, or distributing of
heroin where that act proves "to be the proximate cause of the death of another."
Rape of a child under the age of eleven is also defined as a capital felony."
Once a person is convicted of a capital felony either by a jury, a judge, or
plea of guilty, the court must conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to decide
between death or life in prison. This proceeding is conducted by the trial judge
and the trial jury (or a specially empaneled jury if there was no trial jury).
After studying all mitigating and aggravating circumstances listed below, a
majority of the jury renders an advisory sentence. This advisory sentence of
the jury may be reached without unanimity. Notwithstanding this recommen-
dation, the court will then enter a sentence. If the sentence is death, it must be
13 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 794.01 (West. Fla. Sess. Law Serv. No. 1, 1973).
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accompanied by a written explanation of why the aggravating circumstances
were sufficient and the mitigating circumstances insufficient. A death sentence
is subject to automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court within 60 days.14
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances are as follows:
Aggravating circumstances-Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to
the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of im-
prisonment;
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person;
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged
or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit any robbery, rape,
arson, burglary, kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing,
placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain;
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws;
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Mitigating circumstances-Mitigating circumstances shall be the following;
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act;
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired;
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.' 5
Finally there is a safety valve provision stating that if the death penalty
should be declared unconstitutional, capital felonies would be punished by life
imprisonment.
This Bill would hopefully satisfy the objections of some of the Justices. The
death penalty is certainly to be used only in the most extreme circumstances.
However, when these circumstances have been fulfilled by a certain crime,
there is a carefully prescribed procedure to deal with the criminal as his deed
demands. There is little room left for discrimination against an individual since
capital felonies and their attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances are
carefully spelled out. The sentencing procedure is perhaps the best that can




be devised to make sentences uniform and to establish a standard for justice.
In the Texas Penal Code Revision (sponsored by the State Bar of Texas),
which will be introduced in the current (1973) legislative session, the proposal
is drafted as follows:
[Section 12.31]
An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony shall be punished by death,
unless the jury after deliberation on punishment recommends leniency, in
which event punishment shall be by confinement in the Texas Department
of Corrections for life.
[Section 19.03-Capital Murder:]
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under
Section 19.02 (a) (1) and:
(1) the murder is done in the commission of or attempt to commit or
the flight from the commission of or attempt to commit any degree
of robbery, kidnapping, forcible rape, or forcible sexual abuse; or
(2) the murder is done for hire or promise of payment by another; or
(3) the murder is done in the commission or in the flight from an
escape or attempted escape from a penal institution; or
(4) the person murdered is a guard or individual working in connec-
tion with the operation of a penal institution and the actor is in-
carcerated in such penal institution; or
(5) the person murdered is a peace officer acting in the lawful dis-
charge of official duty, and the actor knew or had been informed
that the person murdered was a peace officer; or
(6) the actor has been previously convicted of intentional or voluntary
murder; or
(7) the murder is done with deliberate premeditation; or
(8) the murder is done with extreme atrocity or cruelty or under cir-
cumstances which show exceptional depravity on the part of the
actor.
(b) An offense under this section is a capital felony.
(c) Prospective jurors in offenses charged under this section shall be
informed that a sentence of life or death is mandatory upon a con-
viction of capital murder and no person shall be qualified to serve as a
juror unless he shall state under oath that the mandatory penalty for
capital murder will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
(d) Where the jury does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of
the circumstances or conditions enumerated under subsections (a) (I)-
(8) occurred or existed in connection with a murder, the actor may
nevertheless be convicted of murder as defined in Section 19.02 or any
other lesser included offense. 6
Although the majority of the Texas Penal Code Revision Committee be-
lieves the statute is restrictive enough to meet either Justice White's or Stewart's
test, the weakness is obvious. Will any discretion left to a jury (or judge) be
valid? The statute does not specify certain findings of fact that would cause
everyone so adjudicated within one of the above categories to be treated alike-
that is, receive the death penalty. One section subject to criticism is number
eight, the "depraved or extreme cruelty" section. All other sections are extremely
16 STATE BAR OF TEXAs, TExAs PENAL CoDE: A PRoPos.D RvISION (1972).
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specific and call for an objective standard. Conceivably one jury could deter-
mine extreme cruelty existed in one case and a separate jury could find that a
co-defendant, who did the same acts in the same case, did not act with extreme
cruelty. In other words, extreme cruelty is whatever the jury believes it. But
at least it gives less discretion to a jury because most of us would probably agree
on whether a particular set of facts demonstrated depravity or extreme cruelty.
For those of us who believe in the death penalty, there is a great need for a
catchall section to cover the truly depraved cases. Otherwise Richard Speck,
who killed eight nurses, would not come within the other more specific sections.
Adolf Eichmarm would not be included or the recent New Orleans sniper(s).
And yet these are the extremely aggravated cases in which virtually all Ameri-
cans would concur the maximum penalty, whatever it may be, should be in-
flicted.
There is no practical way to define the possible atrocities that can be as
diverse as the depraved mind can devise. Perhaps the Supreme Court in its
wisdom would recognize that if there is a need for any death penalty, it is in
these instances, and that the proposed Texas definition does provide sufficient
guidelines to meet the test.
The big objection to the Texas proposal is that a jury can render a life-
or-death verdict for any of the capital crimes. In my opinion, this must be
changed to satisfy either Justice White or justice Stewart.
III. Is the Death Penalty Worth the Trouble?
The question is not, should there be a death penalty. The vast majority of
Americans have answered that question through their elected representatives
in forty states and a United States Senate that unanimously enacted an air piracy
statute just a few months ago. The people speaking through referendums such
as the one in California where over two to one (67.5 to 32.5%) voted in favor
of the death penalty, also want the death penalty.
The more subtle and realistic question is: Is the death penalty worth the
trouble in light of the many obstacles not the least of which is the Furman v.
Georgia opinion?
Before I go into my reasons, let me clear up one matter where I believe
the majority of the Supreme Court is off base. Many opponents of capital
punishment tender the same fallacious reasoning. They assume that since so
few receive the death penalty, this is a form of discrimination. Nothing could be
further from the truth. If we were to extend this line of reasoning, the very
same argument could be made against a natural life sentence, life imprisonment,
or any long term of years.
The average sentence for murder in my jurisdiction, Harris County (a
country of approximately 2 million persons), is somewhere in the neighborhood
of 12 years. Of the homicides the last full year of the death penalty, 1971, there
were 277 cases tried for murder with malice (first-degree murder); 154 were
convicted, and there were three death penalties and nine life sentences. Nearly
[Vol. 48: 850O]
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every word written in Furman v. Georgia would be equally applicable for the
nine who received life imprisonment.
Why do so few cases receive the most stringent penalties? In my jurisdic-
tion, out of 100% of the homicides committed, 10% will not be arrested, 25%
will not be indicted, and another 10% will be dismissed on insufficient evidence
or acquitted after trial. Of the 45% who are tried for murder and convicted,
the conviction will be for a lesser offense than first-degree murder about half
the time. In this weeding-out process some guilty men will not receive the
punishment due them. Yet no one would seriously contend that because many
guilty parties get off, all should be acquitted in order to insure equal justice.
Actually there is a fairly universal concensus on which cases should receive
the harshest penalties. Consider the following murder cases for example. Some
70% of the killings are between persons who knew each other. Nearly all of
these occur in a state of passion over such things as a 50 cents pool bet, dancing
with the wrong person, or even more likely a domestic quarrel. These crimes
are extremely serious, but any jury would laugh at the prosecutor seeking the
death penalty in a typical crime of passion situation. It is only in the bizarre
murder, the killing for hire or during another serious crime, and a few other
isolated instances that the people of this country want to see the death penalty
applied. And these crimes are a small percentage of the overall murders. The
prosecutors of Texas (as well as any judge or defense attorney) can listen to a
set of facts and tell you whether it is a death penalty case. A recent survey of the
Texas District and County Attorneys Association revealed that in the past five
years there were only 87 cases where the district attorneys sought the death
penalty. In 37 of these instances (over 40%) juries rendered a death penalty
verdict.
The truth of the matter is that there should be very few death penalty
sentences. Only a very few cases warrant this extreme measure. It takes two
essential ingredients to obtain a death penalty: (1) overwhelming proof of the
defendant's guilt and (2) an extremely aggravated fact situation. What is so
surprising is Justice White's and Justice Stewart's conclusion that there is some-
thing highly improper in so few people receiving the death penalty.
If there is any injustice in those cases deserving the death penalty, it is that
some defendants escape with life imprisonment or a term of years due to superior
defense counsel or an unusually sympathetic jury. But by anyone's standards
this is less of an injustice than the murderer who goes free because he is never
arrested or his case is dismissed due to a missing witness, the Miranda decision,
or a motion to suppress.
There is no question that an unusually talented defense counsel with rela-
tively unlimited resources can sharply reduce the odds of a defendant's receiving
the death penalty. Although this may be a valid argument against the death
penalty, it should equally apply to any defendant who receives life, or for that
matter is even convicted, if the defendant did not have the very best lawyer in
the state representing him.
If then, the death penalty is to be meted out very sparingly, why is it worth
the trouble? Although rehabilitation and punishment are generally considered
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reasonable purposes of imprisonment, some patterns of criminal conduct indicate
that the criminal is hopeless. Why should we take a chance with a murderer,
whose past history indicates is likely to kill again?
In a sense, the criminal is taking his own life when he commits a capital
crime. Society is responsible for the safety and security of its members. There-
fore, it has the right to remove a person who threatens this safety and security.
But perhaps the most important argument for capital punishment is that
it is a deterrent. There are some people who fear nothing but death itself, and
to place society's innocent in the hands of these uncontrollables without hope of
fair recompense would be to play the fool. In law enforcement, idealism un-
tempered with realism is sheer folly.
The death penalty deterred an escapee from a Texas prison. The inmate
abducted a woman, stole her car and headed west. When asked why he didn't
kill this person who told police his direction of travel that led to his capture, the
inmate, already under a life sentence, said he didn't want to ride "Old Sparky."
I have talked to robbers, who said the only reason they didn't kill the only eye
witness was the threat of the electric chair.
Even England, upon allegedly abolishing the death penalty, kept it for
second-offender murders, for killing a prison guard and for killing a policeman.
Wasn't this hypocritical? Apparently they believed it a deterrent for the killer of
the guard or the policeman, or at least the second time around.
And if Charles Manson and his companions were executed tomorrow, might
not some future defendant think twice before shooting, beating and stabbing
seven innocent victims a total of 1,691 times to satisfy a lustful and depraved
desire? What about the next airline bomber? Future victims need all the pro-
tection society can give them.
There is no way to measure or predict how many murderers are deterred by
the death penalty. Since the moratorium on the death penalty which lasted about
ten years, crimes of violence have drastically increased. In my opinion, a death
penalty, even sparingly used, would cut down on certain types of murders such
as premeditated murder and killings during robberies.
One last thing worthy of mention is that in certain cases society expects
justice or retribution. If we were to ignore the retribution aspect and concentrate
solely on rehabilitation, murderers would receive the lowest sentences as a group
because they are the least likely as a group to repeat. Once caught, Adolf
Eichmann would probably be one of the better risks. There are some cases that
call for the death penalty. Even Justice Stewart in his opinion said:
On that score I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a
constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling
that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important
purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When
people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve" then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch
law.37
17 408 U.S. at 308.
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We must recongize that retribution is an ingredient of justice-particularly
where a human life is unlawfully taken. Otherwise, we would not impose any
penalty for the typical fit of passion killer who does not need to be rehabilitated
and who is the least likely to be deterred by any punishment.
I do think the death penalty is worth the effort. In the interest of justice as
well as public safety, I hope most of the states enact appropriate statutes. In this
regard, legislation similar to Florida's should be preferred. It allows participa-
tion by the jury, but the judge makes the final decision. The Florida statute sets
up exacting guidelines where the death penalty is applicable-including statutory
mitigating and aggravating factors. Lastly, it provides for sentencing review by
the state's supreme court and thus a system for statewide uniformity.
